

- Bertrand Russell (1872- 1970)
  - English philosopher and logician
  - Major philosophers of 20th century
  - Protested Vietnam and Nuclear Buildup
  
- The value of philosophy
  - The common view of philosophy, since its concerned with such abstract subjects, ideas, theories, innocent but useless trifling, hair splitting distinctions, and controversies on matters which knowledge is impossible has no use or little value
  - The practical man or the instinctive man anyone who recognizes the practical needs of human beings but who is oblivious of the necessity of providing food for the mind (pg 9)
  
- What is wrong with the common view of philosophy
  - Many disciplines (medicine, engineering) have value primarily because they are directly beneficial to mankind in general
  - "this utility does not belong to philosophy" (pg 9)
  - Philosophy has an indirect benefit to society in general via the direct effects it has on the lives of those who study it (students of philosophy)
  - What value does it present to those who study it?
    - Philosophy aims at knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions prejudices and beliefs
  - Philosophers rarely if ever offer uncontroversial or obviously correct answers to the big questions of philosophy --- the value of philosophy is in fact to be sought largely in its very uncertainty (pg 10)
  - Philosophy is unable to tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts which it raises is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom (pg 10)
  - Through practice of philosophy we can escape the narrow instinctive and unexamined life of the so-called practical man
  
- What is involved in the practice of philosophy?
  - Chiefly involved providing and critically assessing arguments
  - An argument is a set of propositions called the premises that purports to provide reason for believing that another proposition called the conclusion is true
  - A proposition that snow is white or Paris Hilton is rich is typically that which is expressed by a declarative sentence "snow is white" expresses the proposition that snow is white and is capable of being true or false
  - Propositions are not identical with the natural language that expresses them... English vs. German are identical because they express the same meaning
  
- What sorts of philosophical arguments are there?
  - Deductive vs. non-deductive arguments
  - Difference exists in the degree of support the premises purport to lend to the conclusion
  - Deductive Arguments
    - An argument whose premises purport to provide support for its conclusion that is so strong that if all the premises are true, it is impossible for the conclusion to be false
    - The virtues of a deductive argument
      - Two questions we ask
        - ◆ Is the argument valid?
        - ◆ Does the conclusion follow from the premises
        - ◆ An argument is deductively valid or simply valid just in case it is such that

necessarily if all of the premises are true then the conclusion is true

- ◆ Validity is a property of the logical form of arguments the logical form of an argument is constituted by the inference underpinning the relation between the premises and conclusion
- An argument can be valid and yet have some or even all false premises and a false conclusion
  - ◆ P1 if Britney Spears is poor, then she is a model citizen
  - ◆ P2 Britney Spears is poor
  - ◆ C thus she is a model citizen
- **Modus Ponens**
  - P1: If P, then Q
  - P2: P.
  - C: Therefore, Q
- **Modus Tollens**
  - P1: If P, then Q
  - P2: Not Q
  - C: So, Not P
- **Disjunctive Syllogism**
  - P1: P or Q
  - P2: Not Q
  - C: Thus P

- The chief virtue of a deductive argument: soundness
- Is the argument sound?
  - An argument is sound just in case (i) it is valid and (ii) it has all true premises
  - Soundness = (validity + all true premises)
  - Thus a sound argument cannot have any false premises or false conclusion
- Two kinds of justification and two kinds of arguments: a priori vs. a posteriori
  - **Priori justification:** a belief is justified a priori just in case its justification does not involve any appeal to sense-experience
    - Mathematics
    - Bachelors are unmarried males
    - Does not need any real-world experience
  - **A posteriori justification:** a belief is justified a posteriori just in case its justification does involve an appeal to sense-experience.
  - An argument is an a priori argument if and only if no premise of the argument is justified a posteriori, an argument is an a posteriori argument if and only if at least one of its premises is justified a posteriori
  - Anselm's ontological argument is an a priori argument: he thinks that God's existence can be demonstrated simply by analyzing and reflecting on the concept of God
- The Ontological Argument
  - "the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God" (Psalm 14:1)
  - Even the fool (or, atheist) has the concept of GOD and understands the meaning of the word 'God' when he hears it or uses it
  - The concept God is that of a being than which none greater is conceivable, and the meaning of the term 'God' just is this concept
  - So God is the understanding - according to Anselm
    - Let us assume, for the moment that the fool is correct, that God does not exist in reality.
    - Given this assumption we can now conceive of a being exactly like God, except that it exists in reality as well as the understanding. Let's refer to this being as Super God
    - But since, according to Anselm, any being that exists in the understanding and in reality is greater than a being that exists only in the understanding, Super God is a greater conceivable being than God.
    - Thus God is not the being than which no greater being is conceivable.
    - But we've already agreed that even the fool understands that God is the greatest conceivable being.
    - Thus God both is and is not that than which no greater being is conceivable.
      - CONTRADICTION
    - So since our original assumption that God does not exist in reality leads to a contradiction, that assumption must be false, therefore God does exist in reality
  - A closer look at the arguments
    - **Definition:** God is that than which no greater being is conceivable
    - **The Greatness Principle (GP):** for all things x and y that exist in the understanding, if x exists in reality and y does not, then x is greater than y.
      - Any being that exists in both reality and in the understanding is greater than

one that exists merely in the understanding.

## 01 / 14 / 08 - Discussion Section

- Huiyuhl Yi
- South Hall 5432-W
- OH: Mondays 11-12:50
  
- 1) Basic Logical Concepts
- 2) Anslem's Argument
- 3) A priori vs. A posteriori
- 4) Objections to Anslem's Argument
  
- If Elaine was seen in the market, then she is not the murderer.
- Elaine was seen in the market.
- Elaine is not the murderer.
  
- **Basic Logical Concepts**
  - Propositions can be true or false
  - Arguments are composed of premises and conclusions
  - Premises are supposed to support conclusion
  - Valid argument is such that if premises are true, the conclusion is true
  - P = antecedent Q = consequence
  - **Modus Ponens:** If P, then Q    P        Therefore Q
  - **Modus Tollens:** If P, then Q    Not Q    Therefore not P
  - 2 Ways to Evaluate an Argument
    - Is the reasoning good? / Is the argument valid?
    - Are all premises true?
  - Goal of presenting an argument is to give a valid argument with all true premises (sound)
  
- **Anslem's Argument**
  - 1) God exists in understanding
  - 2) God exists in reality
  - God: that which nothing greater can be conceived
  - Reductio ad Absurdum
    - Want to prove: P
    - Assume: P is false
    - Attempt to contradict assumption through absurdity
  - Prove: god exists in reality
  - Assume: God does not exist in reality
  - We can conceive of SuperGod
  - Super God is greater than God (according to Greatness principle)
  - God is not that which nothing greater can be conceived
  - God is that which nothing greater can be conceived by definition.
  - Conclusion: God exists in reality

- A closer look at the argument: some crucial assumptions
  - Definition; God is that which no greater being is conceivable
  - The Greatness Principle (GP): for all things x and y that exist in the understanding, if x exists in reality and y does not, then x is a greater thing than y. Any individual that exists in both reality and in the understanding is greater than one that exists merely in the understanding
  - The law of non-contradiction: nothing can be and not be in the same respect and at the same time
    - Where p is any proposition, it can't be that both P and not p are true simultaneously
    - Contradictions are *never* true.
  
- The Form of Anselm's argument
  - **Reductio ad absurdum** "reduction to the absurd"
  - Demonstrates the truth of a proposition by deriving a contradiction from its negation
    - If we wish to show that some proposition p is true, we'll start by assuming that its negation, not p, is true
    - Then we do a bit of reasoning under this assumption to reach a contradiction
    - We thereby show that the assumption, not p, is false
    - P must be true, then, since its negation, not p, is false. For all propositions p it is necessary that either p or its negation, not p, is true
  
- A more formal statement of the argument
  - Assumption for reduction: God does not exist in reality
  - Premise: another being (super god) is conceivable that is just like god, except that it exists in reality
  - C1: thus god is not that than which none greater is conceivable (from premise and GP)
  - C2: thus, god is both is and is not that than which none greater and conceivable (By **Def** and C1)
  - C3: Therefore, God does exist in reality (By C2 and the law of non-contradiction)
  
- Some Objections to Anselm's Ontological Argument
  - Objection 1: Definition is false
    - God is not that than which no greater can be conceived. The conception of God put forth by def is erroneous. God isn't like that and since def is false, Anselm does not establish his conclusion that God exists
  - Replies to Objection 1
    - Def is true, it is an accurate minimal conception of God, at least as God is conceived of in the theistic traditions (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) according to which God is, at a minimum, greater than any other being of which you can conceive. So, if you think you are conceiving of a greater being than God, you are mistaken.
    - Okay, so def is false, God isn't the greatest conceivable thing. But we can fix it by substituting for the name God, another name, say schmod, to get:
      - Schmod, is that than which no greater being is conceivable
      - Now we rerun the argument again and establish that schmod the greatest conceivable being exists in reality. Isn't that still interesting?
      - So this objection even if true, doesn't prevent the argument from establishing a remarkable conclusion (that schmod exists)
  - Objection 2: (Gaunilo's Objection)
    - There are infinitely many arguments of the same form that purport to establish the existence of all sorts of ridiculous beings that we would never accept as existing. Anselm's reasoning, therefore, must be fallacious.
    - Gaunilo's Parody Argument
      - Substitute for each occurrence of God in Def an occurrence of "the lost island" and then for every occurrence in the argument of the word "being" an occurrence of "island"

- The lost island is that than which no greater island is conceivable
  - Assume, for reductio, that the lost island does not exist in reality
  - Now we can conceive of another island (super island) that is exactly like the lost island, except that it does exist in reality
  - But then super island is a greater conceivable island than the lost island, since it exists both in understanding and reality
  - Thus lost island is not that than which no greater island is conceivable
  - Lost island is and is not greatest conceivable island
- Allows you to argue anything into existence a priori
- Anselm's argument is then interest relative
- Anselm's reply to Gaunilo
  - Argued his concept only applied to God
- Objection 3: Kant's Objection
  - Anselm's argument rests on a fundamental mistake in treating existence as an ordinary property.
  - The English verb exists is not a predicate or at least not a predicate that expresses a legitimate concept or property of individuals
  - Existence is not some additional property a thing can have on top of the other properties it has
  - One cannot invoke some supposed concept or property of existence in forming the concept of something, i.e. if we wish to form the concept of the greatest conceivable being, it is illegitimate to include in that concept some supposed property of existence)
  - Existence is a precondition for having any properties at all.

- Some worries about Kant's objection
  - Exists certainly seems to be a predicate of English. Sentences formed with exists occurring in verb phrase position are perfectly grammatical sentences in English
  - Moreover, it is really the case that there is no perfectly legitimate concept or property of existence for individuals? Why suppose not?
  - Is it really the case that existence is instead a precondition for having any properties at all - can non-existent individuals still have properties?
  
- St. Thomas Aquinas
  - Studied the writings of Aristotle with Albertus Magnus and became a life-long commentator on them
  - Most important work: The Summa Theologica
  - Canonized in 1323
  - Two methods of coming to know something about God
    - **Faith** (or revelation) may provide the believer with knowledge of the existence and nature of God and our relation to him - e.g. some of the attributes of God, how we ought to worship God and live according to God's will, etc.
    - **Reason** which can provide only the knowledge that God exists
  - The first way: the argument from change
    - As our sense show to be true, some things in the world change (children become adults, acorns change into oak trees)
    - Those things that do change are always changed by something else.
      - For a thing to change in some respect, it must have the potential to change in that respect, and it must be changed in that respect by something else that is itself *actual* in that respect
    - To cause change is just to draw something out of potentiality into actuality, and this can only be done by something that is in actuality
      - Wood example: something actually hot, like fire, makes wood which is potentially hot become actually hot, thereby changing and altering that wood.
    - A thing cannot be simultaneously potentially F and actually F
    - It is therefore impossible for something to both undergo a change and to be the cause of that change
    - Therefore, whatever undergoes a change must be changed by another thing.
    - And if this other thing undergoes change, it also must be changed by something else, and so on
    - But this series of changes cannot go back to infinity
      - If it did then there wouldn't be a first or primary cause of change and therefore, no secondary ones either.
    - Therefore, there must have been some first or primary cause of change that wasn't itself changed by anything else. God is this first cause of change.
  - A closer look at the argument
    - A general principle about change
      - **PC** Principle of Change: a thing only undergoes a change in as much as it has a potentiality for being that into which it changes, while a thing only causes change in as much as it is actual
        - ◆ Change consists in going from being merely potentially F to being actually F where F is some property
        - ◆ If a thing changes by going from being merely potentially F to being actually F, it must be caused to do by something which is already actually F
      - **A:** A crucial assumption: nothing can be both merely potentially F and actually F at one and the same time
      - It follows from PC and A that it is impossible for something that undergoes a change

- to be the cause of that very change; self-caused change is impossible
- ★? □ What about properties of an object causing the change in an object
  - A More formal statement of the argument
    - Some things in the world change (from empirical observation)
    - P2: Whatever changes is caused to change by some other thing By PC and A
    - P3: Series of changes cannot go back to infinity
    - Thus there must have been a first cause of change P2, P3
    - God is the only being that could be the first cause of change
    - Therefore, God exists
  - Depends on Judeo-Christian notion of God being immutable and unchanging

- Aquinas: God is the only being that could be the first cause of change
  - Therefore God exists

### Objections to the Argument from Change

- Objection 1: the second premise of the argument appears to be in direct conflict with the conclusion of the argument (i.e. the notion of God as something that is a cause of change but is itself unchanged and unchangeable)
  - The process of causing a change is surely a kind of change itself (.e. going from being a potential cause of change to an actual cause of change)
- Objection 2: the third premise (that the series of changes cannot go back to infinity is false)
  - An infinite series of changes does not include a single primary cause of change is the absence of which eliminates the possibility of the existence of all other causes of change
  - Rather what explains why A caused B to change is C, and what explains C's changing is something else, D, and so on ad infinitum
  - If the series is infinite, we need not posit a first cause of change
- Aquinas' Third Way: The argument from necessity
  - The third way of proving God's existence concerns facts about the possibility and necessity
  - It concerns facts about the nature of possible and contingent beings from necessary beings
    - **Contingent individual**: any individual that is generated and corrupted. (goes in and out of existence). Any individual that can fail to exist and depends on another thing for its existence is a contingent individual
    - **Necessary individual**: any individual that is not generable or corruptible. Any individual that cannot fail to exist and depends on no further thing for its existence is a necessary individual
    - Every individual is either a contingent individual or a necessary individual
  - The principle of No Creation (Ex Nihilo) (ExN)
    - There is not any individual that can be generated or brought into existence from nothing
    - For every individual x that is generated there exists another individual y that caused x to be generated
    - Something can't come from nothing
    - We find in the world that there exist contingent entities
    - But it is impossible that every being that exists is a contingent individual because if something can fail to exist there must have been a time at which it has failed to exist
    - Therefore if everything could fail to exist, there would have been a time at which nothing existed
    - But there couldn't have been a time at which nothing existed because contingent individuals exist now
    - Not every individual that exists is a contingent individual, therefore there exists a necessary being.
    - And this everyone understands to be God, therefore, God exists
  - A restatement of the argument as a reductio
    - P1: all individuals are contingent (assumption for reductio)
    - P2: there exists some contingent individuals. (By empirical evidence)
    - P3: for all individuals x, if x is contingent, then there was some time t at which x failed to exist (By def. of contingent individuals)
    - C1: so if all individuals are contingent, then there is some time at which nothing existed (by p1, P3)
    - C2: so there is some time t at which nothing existed. (By P1, C1, modus ponens)
  - The argument goes on...
    - P4: but it is not possible that there is some time t at which nothing existed.

- (i) if there was some such time t then no contingent individuals would now exist (by ExN)
- (ii) but there do not exist contingent individuals (By P2)
- C3: so there is some time t at which nothing existed and it is not the case that there is some time at which nothing existed - by C2, P4
- C4: thus is it not the case that all individuals are contingent, there is at least one individual for which there is no time at which it fails to exist (by C3, law of non-contradiction, end of deducutio)
  - ◆ a) this individual is a necessary individual (by def of necessary being)
  - ◆ b) everyone understands this being to be god
- C5: Therefore God exists
- Objections to Aquinas's The Third Way
  - Objection 1: the final step in the argument from the claim that there exists a necessary being to the claim that God (a unique necessary being exists, is fallacious)
    - The first of these claims does not preclude the possibility of there being many necessary beings
    - So, the argument does not establish the existence of a unique necessary being (in this case, God)
  - Objection 2: Aquinas seems to think that he can pass from the premise that every contingent being has a some time to the conclusion that there is some time at which every contingent being fails to exist.
    - But this inference is patently fallacious it is an example at what logicians call the quantifier shift fallacy.

### The Problem of Evil

- The Judeo Christian Conception of God, or the Trip Omni conception
  - If god exists, then god is omniscient (i.e. all knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful) and omnibenevolent (perfectly good)
  - **Omniscience** = a being is omniscient just in case it knows (or can know) all there is to know
  - **Omnipotence** = a being is omnipotent just in case it's able to perform any action (or bring about any state of affairs) that is logically possible to perform (or bring about)
  - **Omnibenevolence** = a being is omnibenevolent just in case it is morally perfect and desires only the good.
  
- Two Varieties of Evil
  - **Moral Evil**: the kinds of evil that consists in or results from an intentional action (or the inaction) of a person (or persons)
    - Common examples: murder, genocide, etc.
  - **Natural Evil**: the kind of evil that results from any event or state of affairs occurring through natural processes, not the results of any persons action or inaction
    - Common examples: earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, diseases
  
- Are these consistent?
  - a. God is omniscient
  - b. God is omnipotent
  - c. God is omnibenevolent
  - d. Evil Exists
  - It appears that any three of these claims entails the negation of the fourth
  
- The general argument from evil
  - a. If god exists, then god is omniscient
  - b. If god exists then god is omnipotent
  - c. If god exists then god is omnibenevolent
  - d. If evil exists then either God is not omniscient, not omnipotent, or not omnibenevolent,
  - e. Thus if evil exists, then God doesn't exist

- The general argument from evil
  - If god exists, then god is omniscient
  - If god exists, then god is omnipotent
  - If god exists, then god is omnibenevolent
  - If evil exists then either god is not omniscient, omnipotent, or omnibenevolent
  
- Theodicy
  - A theodicy is an attempt to reconcile the existence of evil or suffering in the world with the existence of a perfect (Tri-Omni) God.
  - A successful theodicy need not provide God's actual reason for permitting evil, but only a possible reason for doing so (such that if God had acted on this reason, permitting evil would be morally justified).
  
- One Theodicy
  - Theodicy 1 (T1): Evil is often a necessary means to good
    - There are occasions on which persons endure or permit some evil (pain or suffering) as a means to achieving some good
    - The patient who undergoes painful medical treatment to improve their health, the parent who punishes their child to improve their character
    - Perhaps God permits a degree of evil in the world since it serves as a means for God to achieve certain goods, such as empathy and compassion
  - An Objection to T1
    - It is certainly true that certain evils (pain and suffering) sometimes serve as causally necessary means of certain goods.
    - Pain for example is often causally connected with that which is beneficial such as the avoidance of greater evils, like injury or death. So it seems that the existence of some evil is causally necessary for the existence of some goods.
    - But this seems to only explain why agents who are restricted by causal laws (such as the laws of nature) should tolerate the existence of some evil for the sake of its associated good.
    - By our tri-Omni conception, God, if he exists is not such an agent. Given that God is omnipotent, God is not restricted by any causal law, and indeed is able to override them. Thus, the existence of causal means-end relationships between certain evils and certain goods does not explain why God should allow for the existence of some evil in the world
  
- Free Will Theodicy
  - Definition: a person x is significantly free with respect to an action A at a time T if and only if x is not causally determined to either perform a or refrain from performing A at t
  - Creatures who are significantly free cannot be causally determined to do only what is right
  - Thus if God creates creatures who are significantly free, God cannot causally determine them to do only what is right.
  - Thus if god creates creatures who are significantly free, he must create creatures who are at least capable of moral evil
  - Thus if god creates a world containing creatures who are significantly free, it will contain creatures who are capable of moral evil
  - If God creates a world containing creatures who are capable of moral evil, God can't guarantee that there will not be evil in that world
  - Thus if God creates a world containing creatures who are significantly free, God can't guarantee that there will not be evil in that world.
  - A world containing creatures who are significantly free is a better world, all else being equal, than a world containing no significantly free creatures
  - Thus there is a good reason for God to create a world containing creatures who are significantly free

- Thus there is a good reason for God to create a world that God Can't guarantee will not contain evil.
- Some responses to the Free Will Theodicy
  - NATURAL EVIL: even if the free will theodicy does provide justification for God's permitting moral evil, it doesn't provide a good reason for God's permitting instances of natural evil
    - So the Free Will Theodicy is at least incomplete
  - The severity of certain cases of moral evil: even if the free will theodicy provides justification for God's creating creatures who are significantly free, it does not justify God's permitting certain severe cases of moral evil (i.e. Genocide)
    - God can put up road blocks in nature to prevent the occurrences of such cases without thereby preventing creatures from having free choice

## 01 / 28 / 08 - Discussion Section

- 1 - Review
- 2 - The Problem of Evil
- 3 - Free Will Theodicy
  
- Kant says that existence is not a property, but rather a precondition for all the other characteristics
  
- Objection to Aquinas' Third Way: (necessary being vs. contingent being)
- No change can be self-caused
  
- Problem of Evil: attempt to disprove the existence of God
  - Suppose we successfully refute the arguments that prove the existence from God
  - Takes Tri-Omni view of God: Omnibenevolent, omniscient, omnipotent
  - Also takes evil to exist
  - One of the 4 premises then must be false
  - We know that evil exists in the world, so it must be one of the notions of God

- **The Free Will Theodicy**
  - Definition: a person x is significantly free with respect to an action a at a time t if and only if x is not causally determined to either perform a or refrain from performing a at t
  - Creatures who are significantly free cannot be causally determined to do only what is right
  - Thus if god creates creatures who are significantly free, God cannot causally determine them to do only what is right.
  - Thus if God creates creatures who are significantly free he must create creatures who are at least capable of moral evil
  - Thus if God creates a world containing creatures who are significantly free it will contain creatures who are capable of moral evil
  - If god creates a world containing creatures who are capable of moral evil, God can't guarantee that there will be no moral evil in that world
  - A world containing creatures who are significantly free is a better world all else being equal than a world containing no significantly free creatures
  - Thus there is a good reason for God to create a world containing creatures who are significantly free.
  - Thus there is a good reason for God to create a world that God can't guarantee will not contain evil
  
- **A Final Objection**
  - The logical possibility of a world containing significantly free agents in which there is no moral evil
  - God's omnipotence is constrained only by logical possibility (by the tri-Omni conception)
  - So if it is logically possible that there be a world in which there exist individuals who are significantly free with respect to at least some actions at least at some times and who never commit moral evil, then the tri-Omni God could have created such a world.
  - But the advocate for the Free Will Theodicy maintains that the tri-Omni God could not have created such a world
    - It seems that the advocate of the FW theodicy must maintain that God could not have made the world such that it both contains significantly free agents and lacks any moral evil
    - But such a world appears to be logically possible
  
- **Propositional Knowledge:** knowledge concerning the truth of propositions: knowing that such and such is the case
  - Examples: I know that  $2+2=4$ , I know that D.P is the place to be fore Halloween, etc.
  - **If S knows P, then S believes that P.**
    - And since knowledge entails truth,
  - **If S knows that P, then P is true.**
    - So,
  - **If S knows that P, then S believes that P and P is true**
  - Question: is having knowledge just having a true belief
  - Justification is necessary for knowledge
    - **If s knows that P, then S is justified in believing that P.**
    - So, **If S knows that P, then S has a justified true belief that P.**
  
- **The Justified True Belief (JTB) Analysis of Knowledge**
  - S knows that P iff
    - 1) S believes that P
    - 2) P is true.
    - 3) S is justified in believing that P.
  - Knowledge is justified true belief (JTB)

- The JTB analysis of knowledge has the logical form of a bi-conditional, any statement in the form of P if and only if Q
  - The only way for a conditional to be false is if the antecedent P is true but the consequent Q is false
  - Every conditional just says that its antecedent is sufficient for its consequent and that its consequent is necessary for its antecedent
- So a **counterexample** to a conditional statement (if P, then Q) will be of the form P but not Q
- A **biconditional** is two conjoined conditionals such that for any statement of the form P if and only if Q to be true it must be true that both conditionals (i) and (ii) are true
  - (i) I P, then Q
  - (ii) If Q, then P
- A **counterexample** to any biconditional statement (P iff Q) will be of either these two forms
  - (i) P but not Q
  - (ii) Q but not P
- A closer look at the JTB analysis
  - Since the JTB analysis is a biconditional for it to be true, both of its two conditionals (i) and (ii) must be true
  - (i) if S knows that P, then S believes that P, and P is true, and S is justified in believing that P
  - (ii) if S believes that P, and P is true, and S is justified in believing that P, then S knows that P
- Gettier's Aim
  - Gettier intends to present a counterexample to the JTB analysis which shows that having a Justified True Belief is not sufficient for having knowledge
  - Gettier intends to show that the conditional (ii) is false
  - (ii) if S believes that P and P is true, and S is justified in believing that P, then S knows that P.
- Gettier's Two Assumptions
  - **1) people can have justified false beliefs**
    - S can be justified in believing that P even though P is false
  - **2) Justification via Deductive inference**
    - If S is justified in believing that P and P logically entails Q, and S infers Q from P and believes that Q on the basis of this inference, the S is justified in believing that Q
  - Case 1
    - Smith and Jones have applied for the same job, and suppose smith is justified in believing the following proposition
    - **(P)** Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket
    - Proposition **(P)** entails proposition **(Q)**
    - **(Q)** the man who will get he job has ten coins in his pocket
    - Suppose that Smith infers **(Q)** from **(P)** and believes that **(Q)** on the basis of this inference
    - So, by assumption 2, Smith is justified in believing that **(Q)**
    - Now suppose that unknown to him, Smith himself, and not Jones, is the man who will get the job. And, also unknown to him, Smith also has ten coins in his pocket.
      - Thus, **(Q)** is true
    - And since Smith believes that **(Q)** and is justified in believing that **(Q)**
      - Smith has a justified true belief that **(Q)**

- But intuitively, Smith does not know that **(Q)**
  - ◆ **(Q)** is true in virtue of facts entirely unknown to Smith

02 / 01 / 08

- An Instance of Justification via Deductive Inference
  - Let P be the proposition that Tim is wearing a hat and is the instructor for Phil 1
  - Let Q be the proposition that the instructor for Phil 1
  - Let S be Luke
  
- Case II:
  - Suppose Smith has strong evidence for proposition **(S)**
  - **(S)** Jones owns a Ford
  - Imagine that Smith starts to think of his other friend Brown who Smith hasn't spoken to in years. Smith has no clue where Brown currently is
  - Suppose Smith is bored at work one day and selects three place-names at random and with them constructs three disjunctive propositions, all of which are logically entailed by **(S)**
    - **(T)** Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston
    - **(U)** Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona
    - **(V)** Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.
  - Suppose that Smith does infer **(T)**, **(U)**, and **(V)** from **(S)** and comes to believe each of them on the basis of these inferences
    - So by assumption 2 (JUSTIFICATION VIA DEDUCTIVE INFERENCE), Smith is justified in believing that each of them is true.
    - Now suppose that unknown to Smith, Jones does not own a Ford (perhaps Jones was only renting, leasing, or borrowing it)
  - Now suppose that by the "sheerest coincidence" and entirely unknown to Smith, "Brown is in Barcelona."
    - Thus **(U)** is true.
  - And since Smith believes that **(U)** and is justified in believing that **(U)**
    - Smith has a justified true belief that **(U)**.
    - But intuitively Smith does not know that **(U)**.

## 02 / 04 / 08 - Discussion Section

- JTB analysis
  - J(s,p): s is justified in believing that p
  - K = JTB
  - S knows that p iff
    - i. S believes that p and
    - ii. P is true, and
    - iii. S is j'ed in believing that p
  - Must meet all the above criteria, a dream with a lucky guess will not satisfy iii
- 2 assumptions of Gettier
  - Fallibilism abt j'n
  - j'n via deductive inference
    - J (s,p) and S correctly deduces Q from P (and believes that q on the basis of inference)
      - Then J (S,Q) (subject is justified in believing that Q)
  - P: jerry will get the job, jerry has 10 coins in his pocket
  - Q: the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket
- Questions on JTB Analysis:
  - ? ○ How can you correctly infer Q from P if P is false?

- Rene Descartes (1596-1650)
  - Many important contributions to physics, physiology, mathematics, as well as philosophy
  - Famous for founding with Galileo, the discipline now known as analytic geometry
- The Foundations of Science
  - "Several years have now passed since I first realized how numerous were the false opinions that in my youth I had taken to be true ,and thus how doubtful were all those that I had subsequently built upon them
  - The upshot of scientific inquiry is supposed to be **knowledge**, but if the foundations of scientific inquiry are **weak** (presuppose falsehoods) then knowledge cannot be obtained.
  - Descartes aims to at least tentatively , withhold judgment on all matters, excepting those which can be believed with absolute certainty
  - And from these latter foundational beliefs, he will build the rest of his belief system regarding the nature of the world, including the nature of mind and matter, and their relation to one another
  - **Foundational (or Basic) beliefs**= self-justifying beliefs; beliefs that cannot be rationally doubted.
- The Method
  - Descartes subjects his beliefs (or the justification for them) to various waves of skeptical doubt; those that survive this doubt are the basic beliefs, which will serve as the foundation for the rest of his knowledge
  - But since he can't doubt each belief individually, he groups them according to the way in which they are purportedly justified.
- The First Wave of Doubt
  - "The senses are sometimes deceptive"
    - Optical illusions, mirages, dimly lit objects
    - Our senses sometimes tell us things that aren't true.
  - "...and it is a mark of prudence never to place out complete trust in those who have deceived us even once"
- The Second Wave of Doubt
  - Sometimes my dreams are so vivid-so much like the experiences had while awake, - that I take them at face value and thus come to believe many things about the world on the basis if them
    - Fireplace dream, though really asleep and in bed.
  - For any moment that I'm actually awake, can I tell **with certainty** at that moment that I am awake and not having one of those vivid dreams?
  - "I determine that I cannot."
  - But, if I do know anything on the basis of my experience at a given moment, then I must know whether I am vividly dreaming or awake at that moment.
    - Dreams aren't a good way to come to be justified in believing things about the world (even if they happen to be true).
  - So, I can't know anything on the basis of my current experience
- The Dreaming Argument - based on the 2nd wave
  - P1: if I know that I'm standing, then I know that I'm not dreaming
  - P2: I don't know that I'm not dreaming
  - C: So, I don't know that I'm standing.
  - The argument is valid, it has the logical form of Modus Tollens
- The scope of the 2nd wave of doubt
  - For "I'm standing" I may substitute any proposition that I believe on the basis of my current perceptual experience.

- So the argument generalizes in a way that threatens every one of my beliefs that is based on my current perceptual experience.
- **Question:** which of my beliefs may still be justified even if the dreaming argument is sound?
  - All of my beliefs that are justified a priori may be justified and perhaps some others as well
  - Mathematical beliefs, modus tollens, belief that there is an external world, all bachelors are unmarried males
- The 3rd Wave of Doubt
  - Suppose that there exists not an all-powerful and all-loving, omnibenevolent god, but an all-powerful, **evil god**
  - Suppose further that the only things that exist are my mind and the Evil Genius
  - The Evil Genius deceives me into thinking that there is a mind independent material world, that I have a body, that there are other people around me, etc.
  - Suppose now that he also deceives me about things which I do not believe on the basis of my experience - as a result of this deception, I come to believe falsely that  $2+2=4$ , etc.
  - **Question:** even if it were true that I am not being deceived by the Evil Genius, as I do believe, could I tell **with certainty** that I am not?
    - Perhaps I couldn't by hypothesis, everything would seem to me the way it does whether I am or am not being so deceived
- The Evil Genius Argument
  - P1: If I know that  $2+2=4$ , then I know that I'm not being deceived by the Evil Genius
  - P2: I don't know that I'm not being deceived by the Evil Genius
  - C: So, I don't know that  $2+2=4$
  - The Argument is Valid, another instance of Modus Tollens - but is it sound? (all true premises)
- The Scope of the 3rd wave of doubt
  - For " $2+2=4$ " I may substitute any proposition that I believe on the basis of my perceptual experience as well as any of my mathematical beliefs or other kinds of a priori justified beliefs
  - So, the argument generalizes to threaten the justification of (perhaps) all of my beliefs, such that, if the argument is sound, I may not know anything at all.
- The General Form of the Skeptic's Argument
  - P1: I know that P, then I know that Not-SK
  - P2: I don't know that Not-SK.
  - C: So, I don't know that P.
  - Where "SK" is some skeptical scenario (like Class A dreaming) and "P" is some *belief* the justification for which is threatened by SK

- The aftermath of the 3rd wave
  - If the evil genius argument is sound, are any of my beliefs still justified?
  - Descartes: if so, then these will be among my foundational or basic beliefs
- Do I know that I exist?
  - Descartes: even if I am being deceived by the Evil Genius into thinking all sorts of things that are not true, the Evil Genius cannot deceive me into thinking that I exist.
  - I cannot rationally doubt my own existence. Why? Because doubting is a way of thinking and thinking requires existence.
- The Cogito Judgment
  - Question: so, is Descartes making the following inference?
  - I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am. (Dubito, ergo cogito, ergo sum)
  - He doesn't explicitly say: Cogito, ergo sum.
  - What he actually says: Cogito, sum.
  - He refers to "I think, I am" as a statement, one that is true on every occasion on which he considers it.
- Descartes on Mind and Body
  - Descartes asks: what am I essentially? What are my essential properties?
  - **Essential property**: property F is an essential property of X if and only if it is necessary that if X exists, then X has F
  - Descartes: I am essentially a thinking thing
  - There is no possible way for the world to be such that I exist, but fail to be a thinking thing
  - **Question**: am I also essentially an extended thing?
  - Another way of asking: am I essentially a material thing? Or am I essentially a body?
    - Material things are essentially extended
    - The wax example
  - Descartes puts the Evil Genius scenario to another purpose (in Meditation VI), that of demonstrating the distinctness of mind and body.
  - In doing so, Descartes assumes the following:
    - **Conceivability entails Possibility (CP)**: if it is conceivable that P, then it is possible that P.
    - **The Existence principle (EP)**: for all X and for all Y, if x=y, then it is not possible that (x exists and y does not exist)
  - The Evil genius scenario illustrates, it is conceivable that I exist, but fail to be extended.
  - Thus it is possible that I exist, but fail to be extended
  - So, I am not essentially extended.
  - So, I do not have a body essentially.
  - But I am essentially a thinking thing
  - So I do have a mind essentially
  - So it is possible that my mind exists but my body does not
  - So, My mind is not identical to my body
  - So, my mind is distinct from my body
- The Conceivability Argument
  - 1 - it is conceivable that my mind exists without my body (evil genius scenario)
  - 2 - so it is possible that my mind exists without my body (1, CP)
  - 3 - So my mind is not identical to my body (2, EP)
  - 4 - So, my mind and body are distinct (3)

- The Conceivability Argument
  - 1 - It is conceivable that my mind exists without my body - (Evil Genius Scenario)
  - 2 - So it is possible that my mind exists without my body - (1, CP)
  - 3 - So my mind is not identical to my body - (2, EP)
  - 4 - So my mind and body are distinct - (3)
  - The conclusion of D's conceivability argument is a statement of the thesis known as **Substance Dualism**
  - More precisely: **the thesis that mind and body are two distinct substances**
  - Descartes' version of substance dualism has an additional thesis: **that mind and body causally interact**, such that the mind affects the body, and vice versa.
  - Contrast any version of Substance Dualism with any version of
    - **Substance Monism**: the thesis that there is only one substance; mind and body are not distinct substances
    - **Material Substance Monism**: the thesis that every mind is identical to some material body
- An objection to the Conceivability Argument
  - The characteristic assumption of the argument (that conceivability entails possibility) is **false**: conceiving that P is **not sufficient** for it being logically possible that P.
  - Counter example 1: true statements of numerical identity ( $x=x$ ,  $x=y$ ) are necessary truths (i.e., its not possible for them to be false)
    - So we have a case of conceiving that P, without it also being true that P is possible
    - So conceivability is **not sufficient** for possibility
  - Counter example 2: true mathematical propositions are necessary truths
    - Goldbach's conjecture: every even number greater than 2 is the sum of two prime numbers.
    - I can conceive that someone will one day discover an even number greater than 2 that is not the sum of two prime numbers.
    - Suppose the conjecture is true. I'm thus able to conceive of something that is not possible
    - Thus, conceivability is **not sufficient** for possibility.
- Another argument for substance dualism: the divisibility argument
  - For the next argument, Descartes makes use of the following uncontroversial claim:
    - **Leibniz's Law (LL)**
    - $(x) (y) (if\ x=y, then\ (x\ is\ F\ iff\ y\ is\ F))$
    - For all x and for all y, if x is identical to y, then x and y share all the same properties
- The Divisibility Argument
  - 1 - my body is divisible
  - 2 - my mind is not divisible
  - 3 - thus my mind is not identical to my body (1,2,LL)
- An Objection to the Divisibility Argument
  - **The argument begs the question**: premise 2 is defensible only if we already assume that the mind is not a material substance (which is what's supposed to be shown)
  - Descartes' opponent should not accept premise 2
  - We can grant that it doesn't make much sense to speak of a particular mental states (a belief, a desire, a pain, as being the kinds of things that are spatially divisible.
  - They can nevertheless all be states of the kind of thing that is spatially divisible (like a brain)
- Objections to Cartesian Dualism
  - **Cartesian Dualism: (i) Substance Dualism**: there are two distinct substances - mind substance and material substances; (ii) these two substances causally interact - the mind causally affects the

- body, and vice versa
- The interaction problem
    - Cartesian Dualism is **internally inconsistent** (i.e., theses (i) and (ii) cannot both be true)
    - We can easily understand how two material things can causally interact, for they are both the same kind of thing
    - All material things are located in space and time, and so, are governed by all the same natural laws
    - But how can a material thing (which is necessarily located in space and time) causally interact with a non-material thing (which is necessarily not located in space and time)?
    - It appears that they cannot. Certainly, if they can, it is utterly mysterious how.
    - The mind and body causally interact only if they are not distinct substances

## 02 / 11 / 08 - Discussion Section

- DESCARTES
  - Meditation 1:
    - 3 waves of doubt
  - Meditation 2:
    - Conceivability argument
    - Objection to CA
    - Divisibility Argument
- 3 Waves of Doubt
  - 1st Wave: Optical Illusions, Mirages, etc. (We cannot trust our senses) *A posteriori*
  - 2nd Wave: Dreaming Argument (I don't know if I'm dreaming)
  - 3rd Wave: Evil Genius Argument (Being actively deceived)
- Dreaming Argument
  - Pr 1:  $K(I'm \text{ Standing}) \rightarrow K(I'm \text{ not dreaming})$
  - Pr 2:  $\sim K(I'm \text{ not dreaming})$
  - Con:  $\sim K(I'm \text{ standing})$
- Conceivability Argument
  - (CP) It's conceivable that P  $\rightarrow$  It's possible that P
  - (EP) For all x&y,  $x=y \rightarrow$  It's not possible that x exists & y does not
  - Pr 1: It's conceivable that my mind exists & my body doesn't
  - Pr 2: It's possible that my mind exists & my body doesn't
  - Con: My mind does not equal my body.

- Ryle's Objection to Cartesian Dualism
  - Objection: Cartesian dualism and the interaction problem for it rest on a **category mistake**
  - A category mistake results whenever one kind of thing or fact is presented as belonging to another kind.
  - The big question for Cartesian Dualists is; How can the mind cause the body to behave in various ways?
  - Ryle - This question results from the following category mistake: it presupposes, falsely, that mind (and the mental lives of persons) are something over and above a person's actual behavior or dispositions to behave.
  - Minds, thoughts, pains, feelings, and the like, are not objects like shoes, apples, brains, or finders. They aren't private inner episodes of a spectral mind either. (There is no Ghost in the Machine!)
  - They are nothing over and above a person's actual behavior or dispositions to behave
  - So, the big problem for C. Dualists (interaction) is dissolved, but only at the expense of Cartesian Dualism itself.
- Ryle's Behaviorism
  - A methodological point: psychology is a proper science only if its subject matter is **public and observable**.
  - The only kind of evidence that is relevant to any proper science is the kind that results from the method of third-person observation or experimentation
  - A Cartesian-based psychology - with its commitment to private inner episodes of the mind and its reliance on introspective evidence - does not, therefore count as a proper science
  - So, psychology is a proper science only if it isn't a Cartesian-based psychology.
  - Psychology proper, then, is not - or should not be - the study of private inner episodes of a "spectral mind"
  - Rather, it is - or should be - the study of observable behavior or dispositions to exhibit such behavior
  - **Philosophical Behaviorism:** having a mind consists in the exhibiting of overt behavior or the possession of dispositions to exhibit such behavior. (Same goes for having a belief, a desire, an intention, a pain, etc.) - belief exists in the uttering of words, ouch, yes, no, etc. when asked a question.
- Behaviorists on Pain
  - Pain does not equal some private inner episode of the soul that somehow mysteriously causes the body of a person to moan, wince or say ouch.
  - Pain = a person's moaning wincing, or saying "Ouch!" or a person's disposition to moan, wince, or say "Ouch!"
- Objections to behaviorism
  - **Objection 1:** consider a possible world that is exactly like ours in respect to the behavior of individuals, except that the majority of individuals in that possible world are brainless automatons controlled by scientists
  - So my behavioral twin at this possible world (twin-Tim) exhibits all the same overt behavior and has all the same dispositions to behave
  - Whenever I stump my toe, I moan
  - Whenever Twin-Tim stubs his toe, he moans
  - A behaviorist seems committed to saying that if one of us is in pain, then so is the other. But intuitively, I am the only one in pain.
  - **Objection 2:** mental states are **causes** of overt behavior (and they **explain** why a person has dispositions to behave in certain conditions).
  - What might causally explain why I drink from a glass of water is (i) my desire to drink water and (ii)

- my belief that this glass before me has water in it
- I have a certain desire and I have belief about how to satisfying that desire. Together they can be the cause of my drinking from the glass.
  - Belief-Desire explanations are quite good causal explanations of behavior.
  - They can also be quite good predictors of behavior
  - Consider the case:
    - Suppose some person is walking along the side of a road and witnesses a violent car accident. The person quickly pulls out her cell phone and dials the following sequence of numbers; 9, 1, ...
    - Can we predict which number she will dial next?
    - She desires to call the emergency line to get help and she believes that by dialing 911 she will achieve this.
    - But something X is the cause of something Y only if there is no conceptual connection between X and Y (i.e. my being an unmarried male cannot be the cause of my being a bachelor.)
    - So, mental states are causes of behavior only if there is no connection between behavior and mental states
    - But behaviorism presupposes that there is a connection
    - So, behaviorism is false.

- Materialism
  - Descartes was right about one thing: mental states are causes of a person's behavior. So, behaviorism must be abandoned. But the interaction problem is devastating to Cartesian dualism. It should therefore be abandoned as well.
  - **Materialism:** every mind is identical to some brain.
  - Brains are the causes of a person's behavior
  - **The identity theory of mental states:** mental states = brain states.
- Materialists on Pain
  - Being in pain = being in brain state B.
  - Where B might be the synchronous firing of the large group of nerve cells in the nervous system known as C-fibers
  - Neurological evidence supports the identification whenever someone is experiencing pain, they are in B and vice versa.
  - One of the popular pieces of evidence that gets put forth in favor of the Identity Theory is that there are correlations between mental states and brain states.
  - But not every correlation is suggestive of an identity
- Correlations:
  - Just because Fs are correlated with Gs does not imply, by itself that  $Fs = Gs$
  - Sometimes a correlation between Fs and Gs can be accounted for by a **direct causal relationship** between Fs and Gs
    - Fs are correlated with Gs because Fs cause Gs or vice versa.
    - Ex. 1: There is a correlation between my car insurance increasing and my getting into car accidents for which I'm at fault.
      - In this case, my getting into car accidents causes my car insurance to increase, and this explains the correlation.
  - Sometimes a correlation between Fs and Gs is explained by an **indirect causal relationship**
    - Fs and Gs are correlated because Fs indirectly cause Gs
    - Fs cause Hs and Hs cause Gs, such that whenever you have a G, you also have an H and whenever you have an H, you also have an F.
    - This would explain the correlation between Fs and Gs.
  - Sometimes a correlation can be explained by a **common cause**
    - Js cause Fs and Js also cause Gs such that whenever you have an F and a G, you also have a J. This would explain the correlation between Fs and Gs: they have a common cause Js.

- The Explanatory role argument for the identity theory
  - Suppose we have good reason to think that a certain type of mental state, M, causes some behavior type, T, to occur
  - Suppose further: being in brain state B has been found to occur when and only when M occurs.
  - But if we settle for mere correlations (not identities) between mental states and brain states, then all we can conclude about our case is the following:
    - Being in B is correlated with the cause of T and the cause of T = mental state M.
    - Clearly, though, an appeal to chance won't explain this **systematic correlation**.
  - Fs and Gs are **systematically correlated** just in case (Fs occur iff Gs occur)
  - So, brain state B and mental state M are systematically correlated just in case (M occurs iff B occurs)
  - Since we've ruled out an appeal to chance, our options for explaining the correlation between M and being in Brain state B are
    - (i) they are identical
    - (ii) There's a direct causal relationship
    - (iii) There's an indirect causal relationship
    - (iv) They have a common cause
  
- The common cause option
  - There may not be any one kind of thing that is the cause of mental state M. Suppose M is **acute pain**. The cause of acute pain is wildly disjunctive, and involve very different kinds of things: having a viral infection, falling off a roof, etc.
  - A wildly disjunctive cause like this one poses a problem for the opponent of I.T.
  - It may very well be the cause of acute pain (a mental state) but given that acute pain is not identical to any brain state, such a cause would not serve as a good explanation for the systematic correlation between acute pain and being in B.
  - So positing identities between mental states and brain states provides **the best explanation** for why M occurs just when being in brain state B occurs
  - These identities thus play a crucial explanatory role
  - So, we should accept the Identity Theory

- What the Identity theory is committed to:
  - The identity theorist:
    - Pain = C Fiber Stimulation
  - This is an identity statement, and so is necessarily true (if true at all)
  - This entails that (i) anything (actual or possible) that does not have C-fibers, or (ii) is otherwise incapable of C-Fiber activation, is incapable of being in pain.
  - The mind is plastic (i.e. Multiply Realizable)
  - **Across humans:** perhaps for most humans pain is realized by the activation of C-Fibers.
  - But this isn't true for all humans: some humans who have had serious brain injuries are incapable of C-fiber stimulation, but nevertheless are capable of being in pain
  - So, pain does not equal C-fiber activation
  - **Across species:** we have good reason to believe that many different species are capable of being in pain, even through their nervous systems aren't relevantly like that of humans
  - Octopi, lizards, snakes, etc. are all capable of being in pain, but none of them have nervous systems quite like humans': we have good reason to think that they don't have C-Fibers to activate.
  - So pain does not equal C-Fiber activation
- The Possibility of Alien Minds
  - Suppose that one day we come into contact with some extraterrestrials (Xenuans) who do not have nervous systems like ours and who have, instead of a brain, a gooey green globule.
  - Being evil, we poke and prod the Xenuans and they seem to find it unpleasant, more and more so as we increase the number and degree of our pokes and prods
  - Can we really rule out that they aren't actually in pain simply because they don't have C-fibers to activate?

- David Lewis on Mad Pain and Martian Pain
  - Two objections to the Identity Theory
    - (i) Martian pain: an instance of multiple-realizability of pain
    - (ii) Mad Pain: pain seems to be only contingently, not necessarily, associated with its causal role.
  
- Functional Kinds
  - What is a carburetor?: a carburetor is anything that mixes fuel and oxygen for an internal combustion engine
  - What *kind of thing* is a carburetor? A carburetor is a **functional kind**. A particular carburetor may be made of metal, or titanium, or steel, or iron, or brass, or aluminum, or some as-yet-undiscovered alien material - what its made of is not essential to it
  - The best way to describe it may be by what it does rather than what it physically is.
  - Anything that performs its role in the purpose of an automobile could be called a carburetor.
  - The concept of a carburetor is thus a **functional concept** in this sense: it refers to a **functional kind**
  - Some concepts used in the sciences (i.e. Physics, biology, etc.) are **functional concepts**
  - The concepts of a black hole, gene, a heart are good examples
  - What is a heart? A heart is (roughly) anything that collects de-oxygenated fluid and pumps it into a circulatory system to allow for gas exchange.
  - What *kind of a thing* is a heart? A heart is a functional kind.
  - In humans, the functional role of a heart is played by a certain type of muscular organ.
  - Mollusks, annelids, arthropods, don't have this type of muscular organ. But they have hearts: the functional role of a heart is played by some other type of organ.
  
- A New Conception of the Mind
  - **Functionalism**: every kind of mental state (i.e. believing, desiring, intending, being in pain, etc.) is constituted solely by its *functional role*: the causal relations it bears to sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and to other mental states.
  - **Mental states are functional states.**
  - **Lewis proposes a version of functionalism whereby our concept of pain is a functional concept**
    - "The concept of pain is the concept of a state that occupies a certain causal role, a state within certain typical causes and effects" (Pg. 304)
    - This functional concept picks out a certain (physical) functional state: C-Fiber stimulation, Thus, pain = C-Fiber Stimulation
  
- The Non-Rigidity of Certain functional Concepts
  - Lewis takes our concept of pain to be a functional concept. But why take this to be relevant to the Multiple-Realizability objection?
  - Enter the notions of rigid and non-rigid designators, and rigid and non-rigid concepts
  
- Definition of a Rigid Designator
  - A singular term *t* which designates (refers to) an individual *x* rigidly designates *x* if and only if *t* designates *x* with respect to every possible world at which *x* exists.
  - A possible world is just a way things could have been
  - Examples: "Mark Twain", "Sam Clemens", etc.
  - Names can be rigidly used to designate individuals across worlds, though they may have been different.
  
- Definition of a Non-Rigid Designator
  - A singular term *t* which designates an individual *x* does so non-rigidly if and only if *t* designates different individuals with respect to different possible worlds
  - Examples: "the inventor of bifocals", "the first President of the United States", etc.

- Ben Franklin's invention of bifocals is an accidental property of his existence, not essential to it.
- Non-rigid is a blanket term that doesn't name an INDIVIDUAL, but rather just A person in general
- Worlds (like the real one) have coinciding definitions for rigid and non-rigid terms, though in all possible worlds, they may not have coinciding definitions

## 02 / 25 / 08 - Discussion Section

- Philosophy of Mind
  - Cartesian Dualism = MSs not physical in nature // Materialist says they are physical in nature
  - Behaviorism =
  - Identity Theory = there are only physical things (like your mind) there is nothing immaterial
  - Functionalism = popularly associated with materialism
- Mental States (MSs)
  - Being in pain or sensations
  - Belief
  - Intending
  - Desire
  - Wanting
  - Emotion - happy, joyful, etc.
  - Are they physical in nature or not? -
- Behaviorism:
  - Facts about MSs **just are**, are nothing and over and above, facts about bodily behaviors and/or dispositions to bodily behaviors (though you may not wince, when you are in pain, you are at least predisposed to wincing)
  - Statements about mental states can, in principle, be translated into statements that describe bodily behaviors or behavioral dispositions.
    - Johnny is in pain is equivalent to meaning that Johnny is disposed to bodily behaviors associated with pain.
    - i.e. Johnny is moaning, or wincing, or writhing, or saying 'ouch', or...
    - This doesn't give us any insight into mental states if he isn't doing anything physical
    - We must add then that Johnny is moaning, wincing, OR IS DISPOSED TO moan, wincing, etc.
  - Objections:
    - Hawking-Type Case (Paralyzed)
    - Faking Case (do exhibit behavior, even though you aren't in pain)
    - Can't explain causal relation between Mental States and Behaviors
- Identity Theory
  - (1) Pain -----> (2) Brain State 911
    - (i) 1 is **identical** to 2 [1 = 2]
    - (ii) 1 **directly causes** 2 [1 ---> 2]
    - (iii) 1 **indirectly causes** 2 [1 ---> x ----> 2]
    - (iv) 1 and 2 have **common causes** [x ----> 1&2]
  - Suffers from something similar to the causation problem of dualism
  - If they are two separate things, how can they causally interact?
  - [non physical things (brain states - pain) interacting with physical things (hot surfaces) ]

- A Test for Rigidity
  - Suppose we wish to determine whether a singular term *t* is rigid or non-rigid. To do so, we ask whether:
    - The individual who is actually *t* could have existed without being *t*.
    - If the answer is no, then *t* is rigid, if it is yes, then *t* is non-rigid
    - ? What about the evil genius scenario?
- Definitions of Rigid and Non-Rigid Concepts
  - A concept is a rigid concept if it "picks out" the same things with respect to every possible world, and is a non-rigid concept otherwise.
  - Lewis maintains that the functional concept of pain is a non-rigid concept, and that the term pain (which he takes to express that concept) is a non-rigid designator of a functional state
- Rigidity and Identity
  - Where *A* and *B* are co-designative rigid designators, an identity statement *A = B*, if true, will be **necessarily true**, or true with *respect to ALL possible worlds*
  - Example: "Mark Twain" = "Sam Clemens"
  - But, if at least one of *A* and *B* are non-rigid, the identity, if true, will be only **contingently true**: it will be false with *respect to SOME possible worlds*.
  - Example: "The Inventor of Bifocals = Ben Franklin"
  - Lewis claims that "Pain = C-Fiber Stimulation" while it is true, is only contingently so, it could have been otherwise.
    - Pain is a non-rigid designator of a certain functional state, in virtue of expressing a non-rigid functional concept. That non-rigid designator picks out different physical states with respect to different possible worlds.
    - Lewis rejects the thesis that all true identities are necessarily true.
  - Pain (and other mental states) are multiply-realizable, but this is no problem for the Identity Theory- if we take mental state to be functional states, and terms designating mental states (like "pain") to be non-rigid.
  - With respect to the actual world, pain = C-Fiber stimulation. But this identity is only contingently true: there are other worlds at which pain is identical to some other physical state, in virtue of that state satisfying at that world the functional role C-Fiber stimulation satisfies at the actual world.

- Lewis on Martian pain: tying it all together
  - Pain non-rigidly designates different physical functional states at different possible worlds
  - It does so in virtue of expressing a non-rigid functional concept, to wit, our concept of pain
  - With respect to the actual world, C-Fiber stimulation is picked out by the functional concept of pain.
  - So, with respect to the actual world, pain = C-Fiber stimulation
  - But there are possible worlds at which other physical states are picked out by the functional concept of pain.
  - So, "Pain=C-Fiber Stimulation" is only contingently true (not necessarily true).
  - There are some truths that are only contingently true, not that all truths are necessarily true
- Lewis on Mad Pain
  - The problem: Pain seems to be only contingently, not necessarily, associated with its causal role.
  - But is this consistent with functionalism?
  - Definition of Functionalism: every kind of mental state (believing, desiring, intending) is constituted solely by its functional role; the causal relations it bears to sensory inputs, behavioral outputs and to other mental states
  - Lewis: "my view is that the concept of pain, or indeed for any other mental state is the concept of a state which occupies a certain causal role, a state with certain typical causes and effects. It is the concept of a state apt for being caused by certain stimuli and apt for causing certain behavior"
  - About the mad man:
    - "he is in pain, but he is not in a state that occupies the causal role of pain for him. He is in a state that occupies that role for most of us, but he is an exception"
    - "the thing to say about mad pain is that the madman is in pain because he is in a state that occupies the causal role of pain for the population"

### The Problem of Free Will and Determinism

- Important Questions
  - What is it to be free with respect to some course of action
  - Is our world deterministic?
  - Can we have free will in a deterministic world?
  - Can we be morally responsible for things we do in a deterministic world?
  - Intuitively, human beings are ( at least quite often) free with respect to the things they do.
  - Each of you came to class today. But you didn't have to. Instead you could've slept in, or studied for another class, or wasted time on Facebook, etc.
  - The presidential elections are coming up I want to vote for the best candidate. So, of the candidates running for office, I must decide who I think is the best. I'll chose which vote to cast on the basis of my decision. It seems that it's up to me which vote I'll cast on election day.
  - Until I've made my decision, the question of which vote I'll cast on election day is **open**.
- Open Paths
  - Multiple ways the world could turn out
  - Future is open to diversion
  - **Van Inwagen**. Think of the complete timeline of our world as a road that forks
  - One has free will if sometimes more than one of the forks in the road of time is "open" to one. One lacks free will if on every occasion on which one must make a decision only one of the forks before one is "open".
- Determinism
  - Van Inwagen: **Determinism** is the thesis that it is true at every moment that the way things then are determines a unique future, that only one of the alternative futures that may exist relative to a given moment is a physically possible continuation of the state of things at that moment"



- What is a **physical possibility**?
- A future state of affairs is physically possible **if and only if** it is consistent with the laws of nature and the current state of the world.
- **Determinism**: the thesis that the current state of the world plus the laws of nature determines a unique future (there is only one physically possible future)
- "The gaps between the long line and the unconnected lines represent causal discontinuities, violations of the laws of nature - in a word, miracles" (pg. 430)

- "one has free will if sometimes more than one of the forks in the road of time is "open" to one. One lacks free will if on every occasion on which one must make a decision only one of the forks before one... is open..."
- Can we have free will in a deterministic world?
  - If you answer "No", then you are an incompatibilist
  - **Incompatibilism:** the thesis that free will and determinism are incompatible
  - If determinism is true, then no one has free will.
  - If anyone has free will, then determinism is not true.
  
  - If you answer "Yes", then you are a compatibilist
  - **Compatibilism:** the thesis that free will and determinism are compatible
  - There can be free will in a deterministic world.
- The Compatibilist's Burden
  - The compatibilist needs to provide an account of free will and openness to alternative futures that is both (i) independently plausible, and (ii) consistent with determinism
- The No Choice Principle
  - Suppose that some proposition, **P**, and some conditional proposition, **If P, then Q** are true.
  - Suppose that no one has (or ever had) any choice about whether these propositions are true.
  - It follows, then, that **Q** is true and no one has (or ever had) any choice about whether **Q** is true.
  - **A statement of the No Choice Principle:** Given that P is true and the condition if P, then Q is true, then if no one has or ever had any choice about whether P or the conditional if P, then Q is true, then no one has or ever had any choice about whether Q is true.
  - The logic behind the No Choice Principle
    - 1) P, and if P, then Q.
    - 2) N(P)
    - 3) N(If P, then Q)
    - 4) So, N(Q) [from 1,2,3, NCP]
  - An application of the No Choice Principle
    - **P:** Plato died long before I was born
    - **Q:** I have never met Plato
  - "Given the No Choice Principle, determinism implies that there is no free will."
  - "That is why the compatibilist must reject the No Choice Principle"
  - The compatibilist says: if determinism is true, I still may be free with respect to the actions I perform
  - Van Inwagen: But if I have no choice about whether it is true that I will perform some particular action,  $\phi$ , then I am not free with respect to  $\phi$ .
  - Most people would grant that I have a choice about which vote I cast in the upcoming Presidential elections.
  - Suppose I cast my vote for candidate X.
  - P: things were thus and so ten million years ago
  - Q: I vote for candidate X
  - 1) P, and if P, then Q
  - 2) N(P)
  - 3) N(If P, then Q)
  - 4) So, N(Q)
- Argument against Compatibilism:
  - If Compatibilism is true, then the No Choice Principle is false
  - The No Choice Principle is not false

- So, Compatibilism is not true [1,2,Modus Tollens]
- A Response to AAC
  - What exactly does having a choice entail?
  - If having a choice about whether or not I  $\phi$  at some time T entails that , at a time before T, it is physically possible that I  $\phi$  and physically possible that I not  $\phi$  , then of course the compatibilist must reject the NCP (because this is inconsistent with determinism).
  - If, however, having a choice about whether or not I  $\phi$  entails only that if I  $\phi$  at T, then my  $\phi$ -ing at T is caused in part by my own naturally formed mental states (e.g., my intention or desire to  $\phi$ ), then the compatibilist need not reject the NCP, but should instead reject premise 1 of AAC.

## 03 / 03 / 08 - Discussion Section

- Topic 1:
  - Mad pain irrelevant to essay, but Martian pain is
  - Explain Behaviorism
    - Mental state = facts about behavior or dispositions
  - Explain Category Mistake (CM) & why Cartesian Dualism and Interaction Problem both rest on CM
    - How can mind and body causally interact if they are such different things
    - Number 1 is odd (True), Number 2 is even (False), Number 1 is green (category mistake)
  - Explain the objection from causation
  - Evaluate this objection
  - Possible Reply from Behaviorism
  - Is this reply adequate?
  
- Topic 2:
  - Explain the identity theory
  - Explain the multiple realizability (MR) argument
  - Is MR successful?
  - Possible reply for ID theory
  - Adequate?

- The compatibilist will probably want to say something similar about what having free will entails
- Roughly that:
- Having free will with respect to my Fi-ing entails only that my fi-ing is caused in part by my naturally-formed mental states (e.g. my intention or desire to fi).
  
- Another Mystery
  - Suppose that incompatibilism is true and that determinism is false
  - Suppose, as many people now believe, that our world works in the way that a quantum-mechanical theory has it - not deterministically, but indeterministically
  - The laws of nature are quantum-mechanical, then they merely probabilify a set of outcomes, given certain conditions, rather than determine a unique outcome given those same conditions
  - This indeterministic view of the world seems to make room for free will:
    - If I am trying to decide between fi-ing or mu-ing, then it is physically possible that I fi and its is physically possible that I mu instead.
  - This entails that , while I am trying to decide whether to fi or mu, but a future in which I fi and mu are open.
  
- The Problem with Indeterminism
  - Suppose that after some careful deliberation I decide (and form the intention), at time T, to fi.
  - So, if I do fi, then my fi-ing will be explained in part by my intention to fi.
  - Intuitively, in normal cases, my own mental states will in part determine what I do.
  - Here's the rub:
    - But If my behavior is indeterministic, then my intending , at time T, to fi could not determine, even in part, how I behave at a later time (much less that I fi).
    - If I do fi, then that "just happens". And if I instead behave in another way, then that just happens.
  - It seems, then, that if my behavior is indeterministic then I have no influence over whether I behave in a way that would count as fi-ing or behave in some different way
  - It seems, in that case, that I have no choice about whether I fi.
  
- A Frightening Result
  - (1) Either determinism or indeterminism is true
  - (2) If determinism is true, then no one has free will
  - (3) If indeterminism is true, then no one has free will
  - (4) So, no one has free will.

- Moral responsibility
  - Intuitively if I am morally responsible for my actions then I have free will with respect to those actions
  - Most philosophers have understood the idea of one's having free will with respect to one's fi-ing as implying that one could have done otherwise.
  - So, it seems that if I am morally responsible for fi-ing, then I could have done otherwise
  - A person who is a morally responsible agent is
    - (i) capable of performing actions that are morally right and actions that are morally wrong, and
    - (ii) may be the subject of moral praise or blame for their actions
  - Suppose Eric Cartman, a south park youngster who is 10 years old, give half of his weekly allowance to a worthy charity. Cartman is not forced to do this by anyone. He could keep the money instead and spend it on other toys or whatever.
    - In this case, it seems that Cartman is deserving of praise for what he does.
    - Suppose however, that Cartman is not such a nice boy. In stead of being a caring and generous person suppose he is a "problem child": he says terrible things to Kyle, demands that other people "respect his authoritas"...
    - As an (oddly lenient) punishment, Cartman's mother forces him to give half his weekly allowance to a worthy charity
    - In this case, is Cartman morally praiseworthy giving money to charity?
  - It seems that if someone could not have done other than what they did, then they are not morally responsible (i.e. they aren't accountable for what they do)
- The principle of alternate possibilities (PAP)
  - **PAP:** a person, S, is morally responsible for what S has done only if S could have done otherwise.
  - Frankfurt on PAP
    - The principle of alternate possibilities is false. A person may well be morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. The principle's plausibility is an illusion, which can be made to vanish by bringing that relevant moral phenomena into sharper focus.
    - **Cases of Coercion:** if someone is coerced into doing something wrong, then they are excused from being morally responsible for what they do
    - **Frankfurt:** we shouldn't confuse PAP with "the very plausible proposition that moral responsibility is excluded by coercion.
- The Case of Jones<sup>4</sup>
  - Suppose a person, Jones, is considering doing something wrong (say, shooting the mayor)
  - Another person, Black, is aware of what Jones is considering , and Black wants Jones to do it and will take any means necessary to ensure that he does.
  - Black implants a chip in Jones' brain that does two things
    - (i) it provides black with info about the status of Jones' decision making process and
    - (ii) if the information suggests that Jones has decided not to shoot the mayor, Black can flip a switch an the chip will cause a change in Jones' mind... Jones will decide to shoot the mayor.
  - Suppose now that Jones attends a banquet where the mayor is giving a speech. Jones brings a gun with him, but he hasn't decided what to do yet.
  - Black is becoming nervous.
  - Finally, when the mayor begins his speech Jones makes up his mind to shoot the mayor, w/out Blacks intervention, and shoots the mayor.
  - So, it seems that Frankfurt's Jones<sup>4</sup> case is a **counterexample** to PAP
  - Jones is morally responsible, but he couldn't have done otherwise

- Personal Identity and Persistence
  - Perry begins with the notion of persistence
    - What is it for one and the same individual to exist at different times?
    - What kinds of adventures can an individual survive?
  - Suppose an individual x goes through bodily death. Is it logically possible (i.e. conceivable) that x survive this?
- Persistence (i.e. survival) and Identity
  - What is it for x at t1 to be the same individual as y at t2?
  - Two notions of identity:
    - **Qualitative identity:** x and y are qualitatively identical iff they are exactly similar
    - **Numerical Identity:** x and y are numerically identical iff x is the very same individual as y
  - The question of persistence over time is about numerical identity
    - Under what conditions can we say that an individual x at t1 is one and the same individual as y at t2?
- An attempt at an answer:
  - X at t1 is one and the same individual as y at t2 iff x is the same person as y.
  - But what does this relation of is the same person as consist in?
- It's Miller Time!
  - Miller's position: "What is fundamentally you is not your body, but your soul or self or mind" (370)
  - Miller takes a Cartesian position about personhood: an individual x is the same person as an individual y iff x and y have the same immaterial mind.
  - Clearly, what concerns us in survival is your mind or soul. It is this which must be identical to the person before me now and the one I expect to see in a thousand years. (371)
- The Cartesian Position
  - In answer to the persistence question:
  - X at t1 is identical to y at t2 iff x is the same person as y
  - X is the same person as y iff x and y share one and the same immaterial mind.
  - Sameness of person just is sameness of mind.
  - Suppose Miller's Cartesian position is correct... How, then, are we to know x and y are the same person?
  - Immaterial minds are not observable. So if we are to judge whether the same person before us now is the same person that was before us then, we cannot directly observe their minds to determine an answer to this question
  - But maybe we can know indirectly
    - We can observe that the physical body before us at t1 is the same body before us at t2
    - Perhaps from that we can infer that the mind before us at t1 is the same mind before us at t2
- The same body same self principle
  - (SBSS) For all minds m and m', (m is associated with body b and m' is associated with body b) if and only if m=m'
  - Bodies are observable. If a mind m is associated with a body b we observe at t1 then if we observe b at t2, we may infer that, if any mind is associated with b at t2, m is associated with b at t2.
  - Suppose we encounter Cartman's body at t1. Assume that, at that time, there is a mind associated with (in the relevant sense) Cartman's body.
  - Suppose now that we encounter Cartman's body at a later time t2, and that there is a mind associated with that body at a later time

- The body at t1 is (numerically) identical to the body at t2. By (SBSS), we may infer that the minds associated with those bodies at those times are identical as well.
- Suppose x at t1 has a mind, and that y at t2 has a mind
- Suppose also that we observe that x and y share the same body
- By (SBSS), we infer that x and y share the same immaterial mind
- Thus, x at t1 is identical to y at t2

## 03 / 10 / 08 - Discussion Section

- 1 - Rigid Designator vs. Non Rigid Designator
  - 2 - Free will and determinism
  - 3 - No Choice Principle
  - 4 - Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) and Frankfurt Case
- 
- Rigid: Picks out one person, the way
  - Non Rigid: Could be anyone given a change of events
- 
- Free Will: It's **often** the case that when A and B are incompatible courses of action, people **can** do A and **can** do B
  - Determinism: The past and Laws of Nature determines / necessitates a unique future
- 
- No Choice Principle (NCP):
    - No one has, and ever had, any choice about the truth of x
    - P: Dinosaurs were extinct a long time before I was born
    - Q: I've never seen Dinosaurs
- 
- Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP): S is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise

- Assuming miller's Cartesian Position, how then are we to know that x at t1 is identical to y at t2.
- Suppose x at t1 has a mind, and that y at t2 has a mind
- Suppose also that we observe that x and y share the same body
- By (SBSS) we infer that x and y share the same immaterial mind
- Thus, x at t1 is identical to y at t2.
  
- Objection to the Same Body, Same Self Principle (SBSS)
  - Why accept (SBSS)?
  - Is it knowable a priori or a posteriori?
  - If it is knowable a priori, then it should apply universally: there shouldn't be a conceivable situation in which it should fail.
  - But what about the case of survival after death?
    - After death, the physical body will eventually cease to exist. Assuming we have some sort of body after death, and aren't just disembodied minds, then it seems that we must have a different body after death.
  - So, the (SBSS) is not knowable a priori, but only a posteriori, on the basis of an observed systematic correlation between bodies and minds
  - "So the principle, 'same body same soul' is a well-confirmed regularity, not something you know 'a priori'" (372)
  - **But how is such a correlation established?**
    - We need a criterion for judging sameness of minds/souls to establish such a correlation.
    - How do we judge that the same mind is associated with the same body at different times?
    - The candy analogy: a correlation between a certain kind of filling and a certain outer wrapping.
  - We can't establish this correlation directly, but can we do it indirectly?
  - We can't do so indirectly, either, since that would appear to assume the (SBSS).
  - To justify the (SBSS), we need an independent means of judging sameness of soul. But we don't have any such criterion.
  
- The Moral of the Story:
  - Miller claims identity of persons consists in identity of immaterial minds.
  - So our judgments about personal identity are judgments about the identity of minds.
  - But, if this is so, then it seems that our judgments of personal identity are groundless
  - But clearly they are not. So we should reject the view that personal identity consists in identity of immaterial mind.
  
- A Response
  - Is there a way to establish a correlation between a mind and a body?
  - Maybe we can establish the correlation via an intermediate link between the two.
  - Psychological attributes are observable (in some sense) via observation of bodily behaviors.
  - Psychological attributes are states of minds
  - Similarity of psychological attributes, sameness of mind?
  
- A counter response
  - No, similarity of psychological attributes is not sufficient to establish sameness of mind
  - Assume that the mind is immaterial and that which one thinks and feels at a time is due to states of the mind at that time
  - Doesn't look like this is going to be a sufficient response - sameness of physical attributes is not sufficient to prove sameness of mind.
  - But does identity of mind follow from similarity of these mental states?
  - No: for all we know, a particular body might be correlated with different but psychologically similar minds at different times.

- So, for all persons x, y, if x actually remembers some thought or action of y, then x actually had that thought or committed that act.
- So, if X actually remembers some thought or action of y, then x is identical to y.
- Wierob objects that Miller's account is circular
  - Survival is possible, because imaginable. It is imaginable, because my identity with some heavenly person is imaginable. To imagine it, we imagine a person... who, First seems to remember my thoughts and actions, and second, is me (379)."

- Miller's First argument that Personal Identity (PI) isn't Bodily Identity (BI)
  - 1 - if PI consists in BI, then our judgments about PI are judgments about BI.
  - 2 - Our judgments about PI are not judgments about BI.
  - 3 - Thus, it is not the case that PI consists in BI.
- Miller's Second Argument
  - It is conceivable that, at some point in the future, I come to have a body different than that body I presently have
  - Suppose at some future time  $t$  I come to discover that I have a body distinct from the body I presently have.
  - Would I then, at  $t$ , conclude that I am a different person at  $t$  than I am now? No.
  - Therefore, personal identity is not bodily identity
- A New View of Personal Identity (PI)
  - Trivial vs. non-trivial judgments of identity
  - Some objects are such that at least some judgments of identity about them are judgments about the parts of those objects being connected in a certain manner. These judgments are non-trivial only when they are judgments about different parts of such objects.
  - Certain entities (rivers, baseball games, etc.) do seem to be made up of parts.
  - But in what sense, if any, are persons made up of parts?
  - Let a person be a sum or collection of person stages
    - Person stage: a stretch of consciousness over a given period of time
    - A person is not some substance(i.e. an immaterial mind) that is distinct from a collection of person stages
- The Lockean Position
  - A person stage  $s$  that exists at time  $t_1$ , is a stage of the same person as a stage  $s'$  that exists at a later time  $t_2$  if and only if  $s'$  contains memories of  $s$ .
  - To be able to remember the thoughts, feelings, etc. of a person who was conscious in the past is what it is to be that person.
  - How does this pertain to the issue of survival?
  - $Y$  at  $t_2$  is a person-stage of the same person as  $x$  at  $t_1$  if and only if  $y$  contains memories as  $x$ .
- Weirob's Objection
  - It is true that, if I remember a thought or feeling of a person in the past, then I am that person.
  - But I must actually be remembering, and not merely seeming to remember, that thought or feeling.
  - Consider two individuals  $x$  and  $y$ . Suppose you are having a conversation with  $x$ , while in the next room,  $y$  is under hypnosis.
  - The hypnotist convinces  $y$  that she is having that very conversation with you. So,  $y$  seems to remember having that conversation with you.

03 / 14 / 08

- More on Weirob's Circularity objection
  - Weirob: Miller's second proposal takes as a premise precisely what it seeks to demonstrate. It assumes the point to be proved.
  - Miller's second proposal is , like the first, an attempt to answer the persistence question
    - What does it mean for x at t1 to be identical to y at t2
  - X at t1 is identical to y at t2 if and only if x is the same person as y.
  - Miller takes persons to be collections of person-stages.
  - So, x at t1 is identical to y at t2 if and only if x and y are person-stages of the same person.
  - Y at t2 is a person stage of the same person as x at t1 if and only if y has actual memories of x
  - Y has actual memories of x if and only if y in fact committed the acts (or had the beliefs, desires, etc.) that x committed (or had).
  - So  $y=x$ . But this is precisely what we sought to demonstrate
- About the Final Exam
  - 6 short answer questions, 10 points each
  - 2 long essay questions, 20 points each
  - Bring a blue book and pen

# Final Exam Review Guide

- **Explain St. Anselm's Ontological Argument.**
  - Definition of God: being for which there is no greater being conceivable
  - Greatness Principle: for all things x and y that exist in understanding, if x exists in reality and y does not, then x is greater than y
  - Argument:
    - Assume God does not exist in reality
    - Conceive of a being like God but also that exist in reality
    - This being is greater than God, called Super God, based on Greatness principle
    - But God is the greatest conceivable being by definition, so contradiction
    - Thus God must exist in reality.
  - **Reductio ad absurdum** "reduction to the absurd"
- **What is Gaunilo's objection to Anselm's Ontological Argument?**
  - There are infinitely many arguments of the same form that purport to establish the existence of all sorts of ridiculous beings that we would never accept as existing. Anselm's reasoning, therefore, must be fallacious.
  - Gaunilo's Parody Argument
    - Substitute for each occurrence of God in Def an occurrence of "the lost island" and then for every occurrence in the argument of the word "being" an occurrence of "island"
    - The lost island is that than which no greater island is conceivable
    - Assume, for reductio, that the lost island does not exist in reality
    - Now we can conceive of another island (super island) that is exactly like the lost island, except that it does exist in reality
    - But then super island is a greater conceivable island than the lost island, since it exists both in understanding and reality
    - Thus lost island is not that than which no greater island is conceivable
    - Lost island is and is not greatest conceivable island
  - Allows you to argue anything into existence a priori
  - Anselm's argument is then interest relative
- **What is Kant's objection to Anselm's Ontological Argument?**
  - Anselm's argument rests on a fundamental mistake in treating existence as an ordinary property.
  - The English verb exists is not a predicate or at least not a predicate that expresses a legitimate concept or property of individuals
  - Existence is not some additional property a thing can have on top of the other properties it has
  - One cannot invoke some supposed concept or property of existence in forming the concept of something, i.e. if we wish to form the concept of the greatest conceivable being, it is illegitimate to include in that concept some supposed property of existence)
  - Existence is a precondition for having any properties at all.
- **Explain St. Aquinas's 1st way of proving God's existence.**
  - A general principle about change
    - **PC** Principle of Change: a thing only undergoes a change in as much as it has a potentiality for being that into which it changes, while a thing only causes change in as much as it is actual
      - ◆ Change consists in going from being merely potentially F to being actually F where F is some property
      - ◆ If a thing changes by going from being merely potentially F to being actually F, it must be caused to do by something which is already actually F
    - **A:** A crucial assumption: nothing can be both merely potentially F and actually F at one and the same time
    - It follows from PC and A that it is impossible for something that undergoes a change to be

- the cause of that very change; self-caused change is impossible
  - A More formal statement of the argument
    - Some things in the world change (from empirical observation)
    - P2: Whatever changes is caused to change by some other thing By PC and A
    - P3: Series of changes cannot go back to infinity
    - Thus there must have been a first cause of change P2, P3
    - God is the only being that could be the first cause of change
    - Therefore, God exists
  - Depends on Judeo-Christian notion of God being immutable and unchanging
- **Explain St. Aquinas's 3rd way of proving God's existence.**
  - The third way of proving God's existence concerns facts about the possibility and necessity
  - It concerns facts about the nature of possible and contingent beings from necessary beings
  - The principle of No Creation (Ex Nihilo) (ExN)
    - There is not any individual that can be generated or brought into existence from nothing
    - For every individual x that is generated there exists another individual y that caused x to be generated
    - Something can't come from nothing
    - We find in the world that there exist contingent entities
    - But it is impossible that every being that exists is a contingent individual because if something can fail to exist there must have been a time at which it has failed to exist
    - Therefore if everything could fail to exist, there would have been a time at which nothing existed
    - But there couldn't have been a time at which nothing existed because contingent individuals exist now
    - Not every individual that exists is a contingent individual, therefore there exists a necessary being.
    - And this everyone understands to be God, therefore, God exists
  - A restatement of the argument as a reductio
    - P1: all individuals are contingent (assumption for reductio)
    - P2: there exists some contingent individuals. (By empirical evidence)
    - P3: for all individuals x, if x is contingent, then there was some time t at which x failed to exist (By def. of contingent individuals)
    - C1: so if all individuals are contingent, then there is some time at which nothing existed (by p1, P3)
    - C2: so there is some time t at which nothing existed. (By P1, C1, modus ponens)
  - The argument goes on...
    - P4: but it is not possible that there is some time t at which nothing existed.
      - (i) if there was some such time t then no contingent individuals would now exist (by ExN)
      - (ii) but there do not exist contingent individuals (By P2)
      - C3: so there is some time t at which nothing existed and it is not the case that there is some time at which nothing existed - by C2, P4
      - C4: thus it is not the case that all individuals are contingent, there is at least one individual for which there is no time at which it fails to exist (by C3, law of non-contradiction, end of deducutio)
        - ◆ a) this individual is a necessary individual (by def of necessary being)
        - ◆ b) everyone understands this being to be god
- **Explain the concepts of a contingent being and a necessary being.**
  - **Contingent individual:** any individual that is generated and corrupted. (goes in and out of existence). Any individual that can fail to exist and depends on another thing for its existence is a contingent individual
  - **Necessary individual:** any individual that is not generable or corruptible. Any individual that cannot fail to exist and depends on no further thing for its existence is a necessary individual
  - Every individual is either a contingent individual or a necessary individual

- **Explain the quantifier shift fallacy objection to Aquinas's 3rd way.**
  - Aquinas seems to think that he can pass from the premise that every contingent being has a some time to the conclusion that there is some time at which every contingent being fails to exist.
  - But this inference is patently fallacious it is an example at what logicians call the quantifier shift fallacy.
  
- **What is a priori justification?**
  - a belief is justified a priori just in case its justification does not involve any appeal to sense-experience (i.e. Mathematics, Bachelors are unmarried males, Does not need any real-world experience)
  
- **What is a posteriori justification?**
  - a belief is justified a posteriori just in case its justification does involve an appeal to sense-experience.
  
- **What is the JTB analysis of knowledge?**
  - $J(s,p)$ : s is justified in believing that p
  - $K = JTB$
  - S knows that p iff
    - i. S believes that p and
    - ii. P is true, and
    - iii. S is j'ed in believing that p
  - Must meet all the above criteria, a dream with a lucky guess will not satisfy iii
  
- **Explain Gettier's putative counterexamples to the JTB analysis of knowledge.**
  - **1) people can have justified false beliefs**
    - S can be justified in believing that P even though P is false
  - **2) Justification via Deductive inference**
    - If S is justified in believing that P and P logically entails Q, and S infers Q from P and believes that Q on the basis of this inference, the S is justified in believing that Q
  - Case 1
    - Smith and Jones have applied for the same job, and suppose smith is justified in believing the following proposition
    - **(P)** Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket
  
    - Proposition **(P)** entails proposition **(Q)**
    - **(Q)** the man who will get he job has ten coins in his pocket
    - Suppose that Smith infers **(Q)** from **(P)** and belives that **(Q)** on the basis of this inference
    - So, by assumption 2, Smith is justified in believing that **(Q)**
  
    - Now suppose that unknown to him, Smith himself, and not Jones, is the man who will get the job. And, also unkonwn to him, Smith also has ten coins in his pocket.
      - Thus, **(Q)** is true
    - And since Smith believes that **(Q)** and is justified in believing that **(Q)**
      - Smith has a justified true belief that **(Q)**
      - But intuitively, Smith does not know that **(Q)**
        - ◆ **(Q)** is true in virtue of facts entirely unknown to Smith
  
- **What are foundational (or basic) beliefs?**
  - self-justifying beliefs; beliefs that cannot be rationally doubted.
  
- **Explain Descartes' 2nd wave of doubt (i.e. the dreaming scenario and the dreaming argument).**
  - Sometimes my dreams are so vivid-so much like the experiences had while awake, - that I take them at face value and thus come to believe many things about the world on the basis if them
  - For any moment that I'm actually awake, can I tell **with certainty** at that moment that I am awake and not having one of those vivid dreams? "I determine that I cannot."
  - But, if I do know anything on the basis of my experience at a given moment, then I must know

- whether I am vividly dreaming or awake at that moment.
    - Dreams aren't a good way to come to be justified in believing things about the world (even if they happen to be true).
  - So, I can't know anything on the basis of my current experience
  - The Dreaming Argument - based on the 2nd wave
  - P1: If I know that I'm standing, then I know that I'm not dreaming
  - P2: I don't know that I'm not dreaming
  - C: So, I don't know that I'm standing.
  - The argument is valid, it has the logical form of Modus Tollens
  - So the argument generalizes in a way that threatens every one of my beliefs that is based on my current perceptual experience.
  - **Question:** which of my beliefs may still be justified even if the dreaming argument is sound?
    - All of my beliefs that are justified a priori may be justified and perhaps some others as well
    - Mathematical beliefs, modus tollens, belief that there is an external world, all bachelors are unmarried males
- **Explain Descartes' 3rd wave of doubt (i.e. the evil genius scenario and the Evil Genius argument).**
  - Suppose that there exists not an all-powerful and all-loving, omnibenevolent god, but an all-powerful, **evil god**
  - Suppose further that the only things that exist are my mind and the Evil Genius
  - The Evil Genius deceives me into thinking that there is a mind independent material world, that I have a body, that there are other people around me, etc.
  - Suppose now that he also deceives me about things which I do not believe on the basis of my experience - as a result of this deception, I come to believe falsely that  $2+2=4$ , etc.
  - **Question:** even if it were true that I am not being deceived by the Evil Genius, as I do believe, could I tell **with certainty** that I am not?
    - Perhaps I couldn't by hypothesis, everything would seem to me the way it does whether I am or am not being so deceived
  - The Evil Genius Argument
  - P1: If I know that  $2+2=4$ , then I know that I'm not being deceived by the Evil Genius
  - P2: I don't know that I'm not being deceived by the Evil Genius
  - C: So, I don't know that  $2+2=4$
  - The Argument is Valid, another instance of Modus Tollens - but is it sound? (all true premises)
  - The Scope of the 3rd wave of doubt
  - For " $2+2=4$ " I may substitute any proposition that I believe on the basis of my perceptual experience as well as any of my mathematical beliefs or other kinds of a priori justified beliefs
  - So, the argument generalizes to threaten the justification of (perhaps) all of my beliefs, such that, if the argument is sound, I may not know anything at all.
  - The General Form of the Skeptic's Argument
  - P1: I know that P, then I know that Not-SK
  - P2: I don't know that Not-SK.
  - C: So, I don't know that P.
  - Where "SK" is some skeptical scenario (like Class A dreaming) and "P" is some *belief* the justification for which is threatened by SK
- **Explain why Descartes thinks that his belief that he exists is a foundational (or basic) belief.**
  - If the evil genius argument is sound, are any of my beliefs still justified?
  - Descartes: if so, then these will be among my foundational or basic beliefs
  - Descartes: even if I am being deceived by the Evil Genius into thinking all sorts of things that are not true, the Evil Genius cannot deceive me into thinking that I exist.
  - I cannot rationally doubt my own existence. Why? Because doubting is a way of thinking and thinking requires existence.
- **What is Cartesian Dualism?**
  - The conclusion of D's conceivability argument is a statement of the thesis known as **Substance Dualism**

- More precisely: **the thesis that mind and body are two distinct substances**
- Descartes' version of substance dualism has an additional thesis: **that mind and body causally interact**, such that the mind affects the body, and vice versa.
- Contrast any version of Substance Dualism with any version of
  - **Substance Monism**: the thesis that there is only one substance; mind and body are not distinct substances
  - **Material Substance Monism**: the thesis that every mind is identical to some material body
- **Explain Descartes' Conceivability argument for Substance Dualism.**
  - 1 - Is it conceivable that my mind exists without my body - (Evil Genius Scenario)
  - 2 - So it is possible that my mind exists without my body - (1, CP)
  - 3 - So my mind is not identical to my body - (2, EP)
  - 4 - So my mind and body are distinct - (3)
- **Explain Descartes' Divisibility argument for Substance Dualism.**
  - For the next argument, Descartes makes use of the following uncontroversial claim:
    - **Leibniz's Law (LL)**
    - $(x) (y) (if\ x=y, then\ (x\ is\ F\ iff\ y\ is\ F))$
    - For all x and for all y, if x is identical to y, then x and y share all the same properties
  - The Divisibility Argument
    - 1 - my body is divisible
    - 2 - my mind is not divisible
    - 3 - thus my mind is not identical to my body (1,2,LL)
- **Explain the Interaction Problem for Cartesian Dualism.**
  - **Cartesian Dualism: (i) Substance Dualism**: there are two distinct substances - mind substance and material substances; (ii) these two substances causally interact - the mind causally affects the body, and vice versa
  - The interaction problem
    - Cartesian Dualism is **internally inconsistent** (i.e., theses (i) and (ii) cannot both be true)
    - We can easily understand how two material things can causally interact, for they are both the same kind of thing
    - All material things are located in space and time, and so, are governed by all the same natural laws
    - But how can a material thing (which is necessarily located in space and time) causally interact with a non-material thing (which is necessarily not located in space and time)?
    - It appears that they cannot. Certainly, if they can, it is utterly mysterious how.
    - The mind and body causally interact only if they are not distinct substances
- **What, according to Gilbert Ryle, is a category mistake (give examples)?**
  - Objection: Cartesian dualism and the interaction problem for it rest on a **category mistake**
  - A category mistake results whenever one kind of thing or fact is presented as belonging to another kind.
- **What is the category mistake that Ryle thinks the Cartesian Dualist is making?**
  - The big question for Cartesian Dualists is; How can the mind cause the body to behave in various ways?
  - Ryle - This question results from the following category mistake: it presupposes, falsely, that mind (and the mental lives of persons) are something over and above a person's actual behavior or dispositions to behave.
  - Minds, thoughts, pains, feelings, and the like, are not objects like shoes, apples, brains, or finders. They aren't private inner episodes of a spectral mind either. (There is no Ghost in the Machine!)
  - They are nothing over and above a person's actual behavior or dispositions to behave
  - So, the big problem for C. Dualists (interaction) is dissolved, but only at the expense of Cartesian Dualism itself.
- **What is Philosophical Behaviorism?**

- **Philosophical Behaviorism:** having a mind consists in the exhibiting of overt behavior or the possession of dispositions to exhibit such behavior. (Same goes for having a belief, a desire, an intention, a pain, etc.) - belief exists in the uttering of words, ouch, yes, no, etc. when asked a question.
- **What is the Identity Theory?**
  - **Materialism:** every mind is identical to some brain.
  - Brains are the causes of a person's behavior
  - **The identity theory of mental states:** mental states = brain states.
  - Being in pain = being in brain state B.
  - Where B might be the synchronous firing of the large group of nerve cells in the nervous system known as C-fibers
  - Neurological evidence supports the identification whenever someone is experiencing pain, they are in B and vice versa.
  - One of the popular pieces of evidence that gets put forth in favor of the Identity Theory is that there are correlations between mental states and brain states.
  - But not every correlation is suggestive of an identity
- **Explain the Multiple Realizability objection to the Identity Theory.**
  - Lewis takes our concept of pain to be a functional concept. But why take this to be relevant to the Multiple-Realizability objection?
  - Enter the notions of rigid and non-rigid designators, and rigid and non-rigid concepts
  - Names can be rigidly used to designate individuals across worlds, though they may have been different.
  - Non-rigid is a blanket term that doesn't name an INDIVIDUAL, but rather just A person in general
  - Worlds (like the real one) have coinciding definitions for rigid and non-rigid terms, though in all possible worlds, they may not have coinciding definitions
- **What is Functionalism?**
  - **Functionalism:** every kind of mental state (i.e. believing, desiring, intending, being in pain, etc.) is constituted solely by its *functional role*: the causal relations it bears to sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and to other mental states.
  - **Mental states are functional states.**
  - **Lewis proposes a version of functionalism whereby our concept of pain is a functional concept**
    - "The concept of pain is the concept of a state that occupies a certain causal role, a state within certain typical causes and effects" (Pg. 304)
    - This functional concept picks out a certain (physical) functional state: C-Fiber stimulation, Thus, pain = C-Fiber Stimulation
  - Lewis takes our concept of pain to be a functional concept. But why take this to be relevant to the Multiple-Realizability objection?
  - Enter the notions of rigid and non-rigid designators, and rigid and non-rigid concepts
- **Explain the notion of a rigid designator.**
  - A singular term t which designates (refers to) an individual x rigidly designates x if and only if t designates x with respect to every possible world at which x exists.
  - A possible world is just a way things could have been
  - Examples: "Mark Twain", "Sam Clemens", etc.
  - Names can be rigidly used to designate individuals across worlds, though they may have been different.
- **Explain David Lewis's response to the Multiple Realizability objection to the Identity Theory.**
  - Two objections to the Identity Theory
    - (i) Martian pain: an instance of multiple-realizability of pain
    - (ii) Mad Pain: pain seems to be only contingently, not necessarily, associated with its causal role.
- **What is Determinism?**

- Van Inwagen: **Determinism** is the thesis that it is true at every moment that the way things then are determines a unique future, that only one of the alternative futures that may exist relative to a given moment is a physically possible continuation of the state of things at that moment"
- What is a **physical possibility**?
- A future state of affairs is physically possible **if and only if** it is consistent with the laws of nature and the current state of the world.
- **Determinism**: the thesis that the current state of the world plus the laws of nature determines a unique future (there is only one physically possible future)
- "The gaps between the long line and the unconnected lines represent causal discontinuities, violations of the laws of nature - in a word, miracles" (pg. 430)
- **What is Compatibilism?**
  - Can we have free will in a deterministic world?
    - If you answer "No", then you are an incompatibilist
    - **Incompatibilism**: the thesis that free will and determinism are incompatible
    - If determinism is true, then no one has free will.
    - If anyone has free will, then determinism is not true.
- **What is Incompatibilism?**
  - Can we have free will in a deterministic world?
    - If you answer "Yes", then you are a compatibilist
    - **Compatibilism**: the thesis that free will and determinism are compatible
    - There can be free will in a deterministic world.
- **What is the No Choice Principle?**
  - Suppose that some proposition, **P**, and some conditional proposition, **If P, then Q** are true.
  - Suppose that no one has (or ever had) any choice about whether these propositions are true.
  - It follows, then, that **Q** is true and no one has (or ever had) any choice about whether **Q** is true.
  - **A statement of the No Choice Principle**: Given that P is true and the condition if P, then Q is true, then if no one has or ever had any choice about whether P or the conditional if P, then Q is true, then no one has or ever had any choice about whether Q is true.
  - The logic behind the No Choice Principle
    - 1) P, and if P, then Q.
    - 2) N(P)
    - 3) N(if P, then Q)
    - 4) So, N(Q) [from 1,2,3, NCP]
  - An application of the No Choice Principle
    - **P**: Plato died long before I was born
    - **Q**: I have never met Plato
  - "Given the No Choice Principle, determinism implies that there is no free will."
  - "That is why the compatibilist must reject the No Choice Principle"
- **What is the Principle of Alternate Possibilities?**
  - **PAP**: a person, S, is morally responsible for what S has done only if S could have done otherwise.
- **Explain Frankfurt's putative counterexample to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.**
  - Frankfurt on PAP
    - The principle of alternate possibilities is false. A person may well be morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. The principle's plausibility is an illusion, which can be made to vanish by bringing that relevant moral phenomena into sharper focus.
    - **Cases of Coercion**: if someone is coerced into doing something wrong, then they are excused from being morally responsible for what they do
    - **Frankfurt**: we shouldn't confuse PAP with "the very plausible proposition that moral responsibility is excluded by coercion.
- **What is the "Same Body, Same Self" principle?**

- (SBSS) For all minds  $m$  and  $m'$ , ( $m$  is associated with body  $b$  and  $m'$  is associated with body  $b$ ) if and only if  $m=m'$
  - Bodies are observable. If a mind  $m$  is associated with a body  $b$  we observe at  $t_1$  then if we observe  $b$  at  $t_2$ , we may infer that, if any mind is associated with  $b$  at  $t_2$ ,  $m$  is associated with  $b$  at  $t_2$ .
  - Suppose we encounter Cartman's body at  $t_1$ . Assume that, at that time, there is a mind associated with (in the relevant sense) Cartman's body.
  - Suppose now that we encounter Cartman's body at a later time  $t_2$ , and that there is a mind associated with that body at a later time
  - The body at  $t_1$  is (numerically) identical to the body at  $t_2$ . By (SBSS), we may infer that the minds associated with those bodies at those times are identical as well.
  - Suppose  $x$  at  $t_1$  has a mind, and that  $y$  at  $t_2$  has a mind
  - Suppose also that we observe that  $x$  and  $y$  share the same body
  - By (SBSS), we infer that  $x$  and  $y$  share the same immaterial mind
  - Thus,  $x$  at  $t_1$  is identical to  $y$  at  $t_2$
- **Explain the Miller character's first proposal for what personal identity consists in.**
    - 1 - if PI consists in  $B_i$ , then our judgments about PI are judgments about  $B_i$ .
    - 2 - Our judgments about PI are not judgments about  $B_i$ .
    - 3 - Thus, it is not the case that PI consists in  $B_i$ .
- **Explain Miller's second proposal for what personal identity consists in.**
    - It is conceivable that, at some point in the future, I come to have a body different than that body I presently have
    - Suppose at some future time  $t$  I come to discover that I have a body distinct from the body I presently have.
    - Would I then, at  $t$ , conclude that I am a different person at  $t$  than I am now? No.
    - Therefore, personal identity is not bodily identity